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Abstract
Vote-buying and voter-coercion are the impending threats when deploying remote online voting into large scale elections. With
a policy of carrot and stick, it will encourage voters to deviate from honest voting strategy and spoil the democratic election. To
deal with this problem, many voting protocols proposed their solutions with the notion of receipt-freeness. However, existing
receipt-free voting protocols either rely on some impractical assumptions as untappable communication channel, or are burden with
heavy voter-side computation and quadratic tallying complexity. In this paper, we present Laocoo¨n, a brand new cryptographic
voting protocol which is practical and light-weight to be deployed in large scale online elections. By taking advantage of proxy
re-encryption, our protocol can defend vote-buying attacks. Furthermore, we introduce a new property, candidate-adaptiveness,
in electronic voting which refers to as every candidate knows the real-time vote number towards himself, while he knows nothing
about others, nor he buys votes. We prove the correctness of our protocol and evaluate the performance with experimental results.
Finally we advance some open problems which will be coped in our future work.
Keywords: Online voting, Mobility, Receipt-freeness, Large scale, Practicality, Proxy re-encryption
1. Introduction
At first glance, remote electronic voting (REV) allows voters
to vote with no spacial restriction, and encourages greater voter
turnout. Furthermore, electronic means can help to reduce the
human cost and accelerate both the computation of election re-
sult and the democratic process. A closer look (Gibson et al.,
2016), however, suggests that remote electronic voting still fails
to gain world wide acceptance. In most countries or regions,
only optical ballot scanners or ATM-like voting machines (i.e.
Direct Recording Electronic machines) are adopted as compo-
nents in government elections.
One point is that (Rubin, 2002), though information technol-
ogy makes voting more efficient and convenient, the threats of
vote-buying and voter-coercion are, in the meantime, exacer-
bated. In elections when candidates are in a statistical tie, unaf-
filiated voters will become the battlefield. Then vote-buying is
a disreputable but efficient approach for the candidates. What
makes matter worse, voter may also have the willing to sell
his/her ballot for a higher price. 1 In elections of poor nations,
unjust voting campaign may even evolve into political coercion
which endangers safety of voters. These attacks exert negative
influence on fairness of voting and the aftermath is catastrophic
to democratization. Paul Collier called this ”democrazy” (Col-
lier, 2011) and delineated pervasive political coercion and vote-
buying phenomena in African elections.
∗Corresponding author
Email address: xionghu.uestc@gmail.com (Hu Xiong)
1One example is the notorious forum for ballot auctioning: www.
vote-auction.net.
Facilitated by anonymous payment means and cryptographic
tools, modern adversaries (malicious candidates) can bribe or
bludgeon voters efficiently and secretly in a distance. Since
the attacks are easier to carry out but harder to trace back, the
defence should be taken into consideration when a remote elec-
tronic voting system is designed. The corresponding terminol-
ogy in electronic voting literatures is privacy, which leads to
several evaluation criteria. One basic binary classification re-
sults in ballot secrecy and receipt-freeness. The former one
means that a voter can keep his/her choice private so that no
”voter-vote” relationship can be externally observed, while the
latter requires that voter must keep his/her choice private (Hirt
& Sako, 2000). That is, the voter is incapable to prove to any
third-party the way he voted, and therefore, the vote-buying
strategy will be abandoned. Receipt-freeness brought a intrigu-
ing crux in remote electronic voting study, and has always been
a research hot-spot. Many investigations have discussed about
this topic and achieved it with different assumptions and design
philosophy. Nevertheless, how to achieve receipt-freeness effi-
ciently and practically, is still a challenging task.
1.1. Related Work
The notion of receipt-freeness was first introduced in 1994
by Benaloh and Tuinstra (Benaloh & Tuinstra, 1994). Their
scheme, based on the assumption of a physical voting booth and
homomorphic encryption, was proved neither convenient nor
receipt-freeness as originally envisaged (Hirt & Sako, 2000).
Since then, researchers commenced the three-decade long study
on receipt-freeness. One stream of research leads to inco-
ercible multi-party computation (MPC), e.g. (Canetti & Gen-
naro, 1996; Hao et al., 2010). Though they provide perfect
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receipt-freeness, as the off side of coin, they are naturally lim-
ited to small-scale (a.k.a. boardroom) voting. In the context
of large-scale receipt-free voting, researchers attempted vari-
ous privacy-preserving primitives, such as homomorphic en-
cryption, mix-net, blind signature and zero knowledge proof,
just to name a few. After early attempts, a consensus has been
reached: receipt-freeness does not stem directly from the prim-
itives, but from some tricky usages or combinations with addi-
tional assumptions.
Mix-net is one commonly proposed tool to backup secure
electronic voting protocols (Chaum, 1981; Fujioka et al., 1992;
Sako & Kilian, 1995; Okamoto, 1997; Ohkubo et al., 1999;
Boneh & Golle, 2002; Chaum et al., 2005; Ryan & Schnei-
der, 2006; Ryan et al., 2009; Carroll & Grosu, 2009; Wu et al.,
2014). Roughly speaking, mix-net is a set of servers which
takes a collection of ciphertexts as input, shuffles and outputs
messages that are unlinkable to the incoming ones. Some vari-
ants of mix-net, e.g. the onion routing (TOR) (Dingledine et al.,
2004), are used to achieve an anonymous communication chan-
nel between voter and voting authorities (Fujioka et al., 1992;
Juels et al., 2005). Besides, mix-net also serves as backbone
in some voting protocols (Chaum, 1981; Sako & Kilian, 1995;
Boneh & Golle, 2002; Juels et al., 2005; Chaum et al., 2005;
Ryan & Schneider, 2006). In a mix-net based voting proto-
col, voter anonymity can be easily achieved. For example, bal-
lots can be treated as ciphertext and cast to the bulletin board
(i.e. a public-accessed database). After the voting process, mix
servers collect the ballots as input, decrypt with shuffling and
output plaintext messages of voter choices. Provided at least
one server is trustworthy, any adversary will not tell which
vote was cast by which voter. It is regrettable that the exam-
ple is not receipt-free. Simply by furnishing the voter with a
pre-determined ciphertext, the adversary can verify whether the
voter cast the particular vote.
Protocols based on homomorphic encryption (Benaloh & Tu-
instra, 1994; Sako & Kilian, 1995; Hirt & Sako, 2000; Chow
et al., 2008; Wen & Buckland, 2009; Yi & Okamoto, 2013; Xia
et al., 2018) share the same vulnerability with those based on
mix-net in achieving receipt-freeness. Different from mix-net
based protocols which are more suitable for elections with mul-
tiple candidates, homomorphic encryption based protocols are
recommended to be deployed in ”YES/NO” voting due to its
linear growth cost related to the number of candidates (Aditya
et al., 2003). Homomorphic encryption is utilized to facilitate
tallying process. Thanks to the addictive or multiplicative 2 ho-
momorphic feature, ballots can be tallied while no single one is
recovered. Hence voter anonymity is preserved.
Generally speaking, receipt-freeness achieved in mix-net or
homomorphic encryption based protocols comes with some as-
sumptions. One example is the physical voting booth (Benaloh
& Tuinstra, 1994; Yu et al., 2018), where voters has perfect
privacy in communication with voting authorities. Following
investigations take untappable channel, a dedicated commu-
2As for the comparison between addictive and multiplicative homomorphic
encryption used in voting protocols, interested reader can refer to (Peng et al.,
2004).
nication channel that is perfectly secret and free from eaves-
dropping, as a replacement to physical voting booth. Stated
roughly, physical voting booth is a full-duplex untappable chan-
nel, while untappable channel can be unidirectional from voter
to voting authorities (Okamoto, 1997) and vice versa (Sako &
Kilian, 1995; Hirt & Sako, 2000). With these assumptions, vot-
ing authorities can add some voter-unknown randomness into
the ballot before it is published to the bulletin board. Since this
process is out of observation from adversaries, voter can not
convince adversaries that he vote as instructed. Thus, receipt-
freeness is achieved.
Though similarity exists in protocols based on mix-net and
homomorphic encryption, Hirt and Sako (Hirt & Sako, 2000)
believe that homomorphic encryption works more efficient than
mix-net in receipt-free voting protocols since mix-net requires a
heavier processing load for tallying. Their protocol is followed
by a more efficient one (Baudron et al., 2001) and these two are
still of the most efficient voting protocols to date. Among those
receipt-free protocols with homomorphic encryption, Masked
Ballot (Wen & Buckland, 2009) distinguishes itself by a tricky
approach of splitting ballot. In this protocol, the digital rep-
resentation of a candidate is split into two parts. One, which
is called the mask, is cast in registration stage and another is
cast in voting stage. Both ballots are encrypted and the tally-
ing correctness is guaranteed by the homomorphic feature of
encryption. By using the mask, vote-buyers are blocked from
the voting process. However, a recent study (Xia et al., 2018)
showed that Masked Ballot is vulnerable to shifting vote attack
and proposed an improvement based on it.
Blind signature well protects anonymity of voters. Okamoto
(Okamoto, 1997) proposed a receipt-free protocol, based on
blind signature, which repairs yet another voting protocol that
the author himself proposed earlier (Okamoto, 1996). Blind
signature based protocol relies on an anonymous untappable
channel, which is an even stronger assumption. Furthermore,
in registration phase, voter needs more than one-round interac-
tion with voting authorities via anonymous untappable channel,
which make the protocol extremely impractical in real world.
Hence few recent study constructs receipt-free protocol with
blind signature.
As demonstrated in (Lee & Kim, 2002), the assumption of
untappable channels is not only impractical, but also unsuitable
for voting over Internet. 3 Nowadays, online voting and mobile
voting are in trend (Jan et al., 2001; Li et al., 2008). Cryptog-
raphers attempt to seek for more practical substitutes. Inspired
by (Magkos et al., 2001), Lee and Kim (Lee & Kim, 2002)
proposed to use tamper-resistant hardware to replace impracti-
cal assumptions in real world. However, trusted hardware may
cause other security concerns and is too costly to be deployed
in large scale elections. In 2005, Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson
(Juels et al., 2005) suggested that the minimum requirement
3The Masked Ballot protocol (Wen & Buckland, 2009) with the assump-
tion of one-way untappable channel claims to design for online voting. In fact,
their protocol is divided into two parts where only the voting part can be put on-
line. As the authors themselves pointed, the registration part in their protocol,
which uses the untappable channel, can not be implemented over the Internet.
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for receipt-freeness is an anonymous channel. Their proposal
has been the most practical receipt-free protocol hitherto and
was implemented to the real world later (Clarkson et al., 2008).
Even so, there are still defects on its quadratic complexity in tal-
lying procedure (Araujo et al., 2010; Spycher et al., 2011) and
the excessively heavy voter-side computation (Xia et al., 2018).
Receipt-freeness is not free. As noted in (Wang et al., 2017),
receipt-freeness is somewhat conflict with verifiability, another
essential property which means the system allows individual
voters to confirm, by a verifiable receipt, that their votes are cor-
rectly decoded and tallied. Verifiability is to create a verifiable
receipt to voters, while receipt-freeness thwarts a preference
provable receipt. Some electronic voting systems (Adida, 2008;
Adida et al., 2009; Bulens et al., 2011), including a recently
proposed open-source implementation (Haenni et al., 2017),
achieve verifiability at the cost of sacrificing receipt-freeness.
A formal proof (Chevallier-Mames et al., 2010), shows that an
electronic voting system cannot simultaneously achieve veri-
fiability and receipt-freeness, unless some strong assumptions,
such as untappable channels, are available. As the consequence,
the proposal of Juels et al. (Juels et al., 2005) and other practical
protocols (such as (Arau´jo et al., 2008)), cease to be universal
verifiable.
1.2. Our Contribution
From the above analysis, we can observe the state-of-the-art
approaches to achieve receipt-freeness in a voting protocol. In
this paper, we propose Laocoo¨n 4, the first proxy re-encryption
based e-voting protocol which enjoys multiple features. The
novel protocol meets the attractive features as follows:
1. Our voting protocol is receipt-free and practical. Dif-
ferent from former investigations, in our study, receipt-
freeness is achieved by a brand new approach which no
longer relies on any impractical physical assumptions. It
only takes an anonymous channel as necessity, which is
demonstrated in (Juels et al., 2005) as the minimal require-
ment for achieving receipt-freeness. The details of secu-
rity analysis of receipt-freeness and other properties are
also discussed.
2. Our voting protocol follows a new property called
candidate-adaptiveness. We consider it reasonable that
during the election process candidate can adopt some cam-
paign strategies such as addressing some speeches. To
achieve this property, candidate is permitted to know the
real time portion of ballots towards him. Since our scheme
is meanwhile receipt-freeness, voters’ privacy will not
leak out and vote selling will not occur when candidate-
adaptiveness is brought in. Furthermore, our protocol is
more suitable for elections with a large number of candi-
dates, and is suitable for both 1-out-of-L and k-out-of-L
candidates elections.
4Laocoo¨n is derived from the name of a Trojan priest, who said the famous
line ”Beware of Greeks bearing gifts” in Virgil’s poem. This name reflects our
main goal: Beware of the malicious Vote-Buyers bearing gifts.
3. Our voting protocol is scalable and can be deployed in on-
line voting or mobile voting. As our evaluation in the ex-
perimental result, the voter-side calculation is light-weight
which can encourage higher voter turnout to make a elec-
tion scalable. Furthermore, in our proposal there is no
restricted physical location where voter cast his ballot.
Hence with the receipt-freeness property, our protocol is
suitable for online voting or mobile voting.
1.3. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
cryptographic tools, proxy re-encryption and multi-designated
verifiers signature, are discussed in Section 2. The model of
electronic voting protocol is introduced in Section 3. In Sec-
tion 4, we delineate the high level rationale and technique de-
tails of our proposed protocol, Laocoo¨n. We give an analysis
of Laocoo¨n and a functionality comparison with other receipt-
free protocols in Section 5. Finally, we conclude our work and
advance some open problems in Section 6.
2. Background
2.1. Proxy Re-Encryption
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) was first introduced by Blaze,
Bleumer and Strauss (Blaze et al., 1998). As an extension of
public key encryption, proxy re-encryption enables a honest-
but-curious proxy to transform a ciphertext encrypted under
delegator’s public key into another ciphertext under delegatee’s
public key without leaking any information of corresponding
message. To perform the transformation correctly, proxy ob-
tains as little information as necessary, where the specific infor-
mation is called a re-encryption key (a.k.a transformation key).
To classify the numerous PRE schemes, Blaze et al. provide
two methods. One classification results from the allowed times
of transformation. If a PRE scheme allows proxy to repeat-
edly transform a ciphertext, e.g. from Alice to Bob, then from
Bob to Charlie, it is multi-use; otherwise, it is single-use. The
other classification results from the allowed direction of trans-
formation. If a PRE scheme allows proxy to use the same re-
encryption key to transform ciphertext from Alice to Bob, and
vice versa, it is bidirectional; otherwise, it is unidirectional.
PRE can be used in such various application scenarios as
email forwarding (Blaze et al., 1998), distributed file systems
(Ateniese et al., 2006), digital rights management (Taban et al.,
2006) and cloud computing (Yu et al., 2010) to avoid heavy
workload of the decryption-then-encryption approach. To the
best of our knowledge, no previous investigation regards elec-
tronic voting as a potential scenario for PRE schemes. Funda-
mentally different from the previous applications of PRE, there
exists no decryption-then-encryption problem in voting proto-
cols. However, by applying a special PRE scheme in a special
approach, one essential property for voting, receipt-freeness,
is achieved practically and with light-weight user-side calcu-
lation.
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2.1.1. Key-private Proxy Re-encryption
In 2009, Ateniese et al. (Ateniese et al., 2009) proposed
the concept of key-private (or anonymous) proxy re-encryption.
This additional useful property of proxy re-encryption refers to
that adversary (proxy) can not deduce the identity of both dele-
gator and delegatee from the re-encryption key. That is, infor-
mation as ”who was speaking privately with whom” (Ateniese
et al., 2009) or ”who is using the re-encryption service” (Shao
et al., 2012) can not be extracted by adversary when the proxy
is compromised.
In practice, the special PRE scheme we applied is the key-
private proxy re-encryption from Ateniese et al. (Ateniese et al.,
2009). Their proposed scheme is a single-use unidirectional
key-private PRE scheme (SU-KP-PRE) with CPA security. De-
spite that CPA security property is much weaker than CCA se-
curity, it is enough for an electronic voting protocol. That is
because, in a round of election, voters and voting authorities
need not to answer the decryption queries.
2.1.2. Function Notions
A single-use unidirectional key-private PRE scheme (SU-
KP-PRE) contains a set of P.P.T. (probably polynomial time)
algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, ReKeyGen, Enc, ReEnc, Dec):
Setup: par ← Setup(1k) takes an input of security parameter
k, returns global public parameter par.
Key Generation: (PKi, S Ki) ← KeyGen(par) takes an in-
put of global public parameter par, returns a pair of pub-
lic/secret key.
Re-Key Generation: rki→ j ← ReKeyGen(S Ki, PK j) takes
an input of the secret key of i, and the public key of j
where j , i, returns a re-encryption key from i to j.
Encryption: ci ← EncPKi (m) takes an input of the public key
of i, and a message m, returns a ciphertext c.
Re-Encryption: c j ← ReEncrki→ j (ci) takes an input of cipher-
text under public key of i, and a re-encryption key from i
to j, returns ciphertext under public key of j.
Decryption: m ← DecS Ki (ci) takes an input of the secret key
of i, and a ciphertext under the public key of i, returns the
original plaintext message m.
Since the security of our voting protocol is related to the con-
struction of PRE scheme, we present the algorithm details of
Ateniese et al.’s (Ateniese et al., 2009) in Appendix A.
2.2. Multi-Designated Verifiers Signature
As a generalization of Designated Verifier Signature (DVS)
introduced by Jakobsson et al. (Jakobsson et al., 1996), the no-
tion of Multi-Designated Verifiers Signatures (MDVS) was dis-
cussed in the rump session of Crypto’03 and later formalized
in (Laguillaumie & Vergnaud, 2004). MDVS allows a signer
to issue a signature whose validity can only be verified by a
specific set of verifiers chosen by the signer. DVS/MDVS are
useful in voting protocols (Juels et al., 2005), since the desig-
nated verifier(s) can forge a indistinguishable fake signature to
defraud adversaries. MDVS provides stronger anonymity than
DVS (Laguillaumie & Vergnaud, 2007), as the number of des-
ignated verifiers extended from one to many.
2.2.1. Function Notions
A MDVS scheme contains a set of P.P.T. algorithms (Setup,
KeyGen, Sign, and Verify). Since the algorithm of Setup
and KeyGen is somehow redundant to the algorithms in PRE
scheme, we only describe the Sign and Verify functions.
Signature: s← SignS KS ,V(m) takes an input message m, a se-
cret key S KS of signer S , and a set of designated verifiers
V, and returns a signature s, which is a DVS of m signed
by S .
Verification: 1/0 ← VerifyPKS ,S KV ,V(s,m) takes an input of
message/signature pair (s,m), the public key PKS of signer
S , the secret key of verifier S KV whose identity is involved
in V, and outputs 1/0 which represented whether the sig-
nature is valid or invalid.
3. Model of Electronic Voting
3.1. Entities
As illustrated in Figure 1, five entities are involved in
Laocoo¨n. Respectively, they are the administrator, the voters,
the proxy, the bulletin board and the candidates. The detailed
definitions of the entities are showed as follows:
Administrator: As the election holder, administrator is to
organize or control the voting process by initializing the system
parameters and triggering different phases of an election. We
use (yA, xA) to denote the pair of public/secret key of adminis-
trator.
Voters: A set of legal voters, which are denoted by ~Lv =
{V1,V2, . . . ,Vn}, are authorized to vote for their preferred candi-
dates with independent judgements. At any time in the election,
legal voters can be corrupted by adversaries, and turn to mali-
cious ones which are willing to sell ballots or vote more than
once. We assume that all voters hold a long-term public/secret
key pair (yV , xV ) that represents their identities.
Proxy: As a role played by independent authorities, proxy is
a honest-but-curious entity that processes on re-encryptable ci-
phertexts and handles the ballots. As shown in Figure 1, proxy
serves not only in registering (Step 5), but also in ballot pro-
cessing (Step 11).
Candidates: A set of candidates, which are denoted by ~Lc =
{C1,C2, . . . ,Ct}, campaign to obtain more votes and compete to
win the election. Unlike most voting protocols, candidates, in
our proposal, participate in tallying process where they uncover
the encrypted transactions and prove the number of votes that
themselves obtain.
Bulletin board: Denoted as BB, bulletin board is a tamper-
resistant and append-only database (Heather & Lundin, 2008)
which can be publicly accessed. Commonly, the existence of
4
VotersAdministrator Proxy Candidates
1. system
initialization
4. create and
send credential
8. ballot
generation 9. vote
11. processing
7. trigger voting
15. trigger opening
12. publish to BB
14. decryption
Bulletin Board
13. read from BB
16. open to BB17. trigger tallying
18. tally
2. publish system
parameters 3. publish theirpublic keys
5. re-encryption
6. dispatch credential
10. read from BB
Fig. 1. System sequence diagram.
BB is to simulate a broadcast communication channel and to
model a public memory for achieving verifiability.
Since no untappable channel is existed in Laocoo¨n, which
means the threat of eavesdropping, there is theoretically no
need to have end-to-end communication. Hence all voting re-
lated information can be uploaded to BB. Note that we also
maintain an end-to-end channel for Step 4∼6, only for reducing
the complexity.
3.2. Functions
We assume that ~Lv is a list of all legal voters, ~Lk is the cor-
responding list of re-encryption keys used in Step 5, and there
exist n (n > 2) candidates in the election. The communication
process among the entities is as shown in Figure 1 which com-
prises 18 steps. We divide the whole process into the following
five phases.
System Setup. In this phase, voting administrator runs the
Setup algorithms of used cryptographic primitives, and pub-
lishes the generated public parameters to the bulletin board.
Administrator also uploads his self-signed public key certifi-
cate and the list of ~Lk used for credential dispatching. Then all
candidates publish their public key for this round of election.
Credential Dispatching. In this phase, anonymous voting
credentials are created and issued by voting administrator, and
dispatched by proxy after a secret shuffle. With the help of
proxy re-encryption, no voting authorities will learn the rela-
tionship between a particular voter and the plaintext credential.
Ballot Casting. Voter generates a ballot for the favoured
candidate. The ballot is later casted to the bulletin board via
anonymous channel. For any ballot that appears on BB, proxy
chooses some random message and processes on the ballot. The
result, namely the voting transaction, which is a ciphertext un-
der candidate’s public key, is also published to BB.
Ballot Opening and Tallying. Candidates engage to open
the ballots towards them. By monitoring bulletin board, can-
didate roughly learns how it positioned versus its competitors.
As Tallying Date approaches, voting administrator informs all
candidates publish their secret key for this round of election. A
pre-designed tallying script on bulletin board will be triggered
on that date. The final tallying result will be published on the
bulletin board then.
Ballot Verifying and Auditing. This is a optional phase to
the whole election. In a period of time after publishing the tal-
lying result, transcript of the bulletin board requests for open
auditing. In the verifiability achieved version of Laocoo¨n, voter
can claim to voting administrator if it finds that its ballot is not
tallied to the result.
3.3. Design Goals
Compared with the existing works, our novel voting protocol,
Laocoo¨n, should satisfy the following properties:
Completeness. The counting of the valid ballots is accurate
when the protocol is followed by all participants.
Ballot secrecy. Voters’ anonymity will be guaranteed by this
protocol, i.e. ballots will not leak information about identities
of both voter and the preferred candidate even if proxy is cor-
rupted.
Unreusability. Ballot from the same legitimate voter will not
be counted twice.
Eligibility. Only legitimate voters’ ballots will be counted.
Vote-and-go. A voter can go off-line once his ballot is
casted. That is, voter will not engage in opening ballots.
Efficiency. The computation and communication consump-
tion of the voting scheme is not too huge to allow voters vote
on tablets or mobile phones.
Mobility. There is no restriction on the designated location
in which voter can cast its ballot.
Receipt-freeness. A voter cannot prove to someone that she
voted in a certain approach.
Verifiability. Any individual voter can confirm that its choice
has been correctly encoded and tallied. 5
In Laocoo¨n, we weaken the fairness property that is men-
tioned as additional requirement in some voting schemes to
Voter-fairness. Fairness property is generally defined as that
no partial result can be computed by anyone before the end
of election. We notice that in some circumstances it is avail-
able for candidate to know how many ballots are towards him
in the election process and to adaptively implement some cam-
paign strategies. Hence we weaken the fairness property and
propose a new voting requirement to satisfy this environment
called Candidate-adaptiveness.
Voter-fairness. No voter can break the protocol to get any
results before ballots opening and tallying.
Candidate-adaptiveness. Each candidate in election can
only know how many ballots are toward it in the election pro-
cess but get no knowledge about the exact number of ballots
towards other explicit competitor. This property is useful when
the number of candidates in an election is more than two.
3.4. Encoding of Ballots
In our proposed protocol, ballots have two different forms.
One is what voter generates and casts to the proxy, and another
is what proxy publishes to the bulletin board.
5Verifiability is served as an extended property in our proposed protocol.
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The former one, called ballot, is the re-encryption key in
proxy re-encryption scheme. It is generated by putting voter’s
voting pseudonym secret key and preferred candidate’s public
key into the re-encryption key generation algorithm ReKey-
Gen. If a voter with pseudonym i favours candidate Cx, the
ballot it casts can be denoted as Ballot ← rki→Cx , where
rki→Cx := ReKeyGen(S Ki, yCx ).
The latter one, named voting transaction, is the re-encrypted
ciphertext under the public key of candidate. The correspond-
ing plaintext is the current timestamp selected by proxy. It is
denoted as δ′j ← ReEncBallot(δ j), where δ j is the encrypted
timestamp δ j ← EncPKi (S tp).
4. The Proposed Protocol: Laocoo¨n
4.1. High Level Idea
Based on the key-private proxy re-encryption scheme and
other cryptographic tools, we now present the high-level design
rationale of our proposed protocol, Laocoo¨n.
To block misbehaved or illegal voters without compromising
their anonymity, which means one essential goal, unreusability,
some cryptographic means that provide anonymous authenti-
cation (Tsang et al., 2008) should be kept in voting protocols.
Our protocol inherits the thought of anonymous credential from
some previous investigations (Juels et al., 2005; Tsang et al.,
2007, 2011; Mateu et al., 2014), but works slightly different. In
our protocol, a legal voter, say Alice, holds two pairs of pub-
lic/secret keys, i.e. a pair of long-term keys that represents her
identity and a pair of short-term keys that is only used in a tem-
poral round of voting process. The pair of short-term key, also
known as Alice’s voting pseudonym, is dispatched with an vot-
ing credential by voting authorities before each round of voting
process. Generally speaking, Alice retain anonymity by the ap-
proach of receiving pseudonym with her long-term keys and
voting with her short-term keys.
Anonymity is brought by pseudonym, while authentication
results in voting credential. The voting credential is comprised
of a short-term public key with a digital certificate from vot-
ing administrator. The usage of anonymous credential shifts
authentication from voting process to an earlier phase. In the
ballot casting phase, a ballot is received as a legal one so long
as it is cast with an unused legal credential. In the earlier phase,
voting authority issues credentials and dispatches them to le-
gitimate voters. If one voting authority is in charge of both
issuing and dispatching, it will readily know which pseudonym
has been distributed to which voter. Hence in our design, we
separate the responsibility into two parts. Voting administra-
tor works as the issuer and proxy works as dispatcher. A PRE
scheme is used in this process to encrypt the credential and
thwart curious proxies. Unless no corruption of all authorities
happens, the crisis of confidence is eliminated. It is noteworthy
that no untappable channel is needed here. Since the plaintext
credential is protected by PRE, no one but the legal voters can
retrieve the voting credential. Though an adversary, say Bob,
can record the encrypted messages by eavesdropping, we will
show why this can not be used to construct a receipt later.
Table 1
The Ideas in Our Proposed Protocol
Goal Method
Authentication Anonymous Credential
Anonymity Pseudonym
Receipt-freeness Key-private Proxy Re-encryption
Efficiency & Mobility Efficient Proxy Re-encryption
Then, we account for how receipt-freeness is achieved.
To achieve receipt-freeness, some voter-unknown randomness
should be added into the ballot by voting authorities. A straight-
forward idea is that, by taking advantage of PRE scheme, bal-
lot can be treated as re-encryptable ciphertext (a.k.a. second-
level ciphertext) and cast to the bulletin board. Since the natu-
ral property of PRE, voting authority (proxy) can transform it
to another one. However, if the re-encryption keys are stored
on proxy server in advance, and Alice only cast the ciphertext
anonymously, proxy will not know which re-encryption key to
use. To make a repair, Alice need to generate the re-encryption
key himself and cast it together with ballot to proxy. Unfortu-
nately, two main defects rise with this repair. The main defect
is that, provided both ciphertext and re-encryption key, any one
including the adversary Bob can finish the transformation. Al-
ice can, therefore, construct a receipt to Bob. Although it makes
sense to allow Alice to vote directly and secretly to authority.
Considered the eavesdropping problem, an untappable channel
is inevitable. Furthermore, as another defect, one may doubt
that voter-side computation cost is rather considerable.
Based on this, we present a more deliberate approach. In
our protocol, ballot is treated as a re-encryption key, other than
any ciphertext. This is possible since the generation of re-
encryption key only involves the public key of preferred voting
candidate and the short-term private key. Then Alice cast the
ballot via an anonymous channel to the bulletin board. A hash
value of the anonymous credential is as well enclosed for au-
thentication. Proxy checks validity of the hash value and use-
ability of the corresponding credential, and then encrypts an
intelligible message with the pseudonym public key of Alice.
Next proxy transforms it with the re-encryption key which Al-
ice cast. The re-encrypted ciphertext will be published to bul-
letin board and can only be decrypted by the preferred candidate
of Alice.
Stated informally, receipt-freeness is achieved from the fol-
lowing facts:
a. Proxy and adversaries cannot extract identities of voter and
candidate from the re-encryption key (i.e. ballot).
b. The voter does not know what message is encrypted and
transferred to the voting transaction on bulletin board.
c. Given the encryption form of credential, the ballot and
the re-encrypted message to adversary, a voter cannot con-
vince him in which way she voted.
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Table 2
Notations used in the proposed voting scheme
Symbol Description
par Public parameters of proxy re-encryption scheme and multi-designated verifiers signature scheme
~Lc A list of candidates
~Lv A list of legal voters
~Lk A list of re-encryption keys from administrator to legitimate voters
~Lσ A list of legitimate credentials
(yE , xE) Long-term public/secret key pair of entity E
(PKi, S Ki) Short-term public/secret key pair of index i
σ Voting credential
m Voting message
δ Voting transaction
hi The hash value of the ith voting credential
rki→ j Re-encryption key from entity i to entity j
Vi A voter, a.k.a. Alice
C j A candidate, a.k.a Bob
d. If adversaries coerce voters to disclose voting credential,
voters can defraud coercers by presenting an indistinguish-
able fake.
To conclude, the main design goals with corresponding meth-
ods are shown in Table 1. Moreover, to make our high level idea
more comprehensive, some details are shown in Figure 2a and
Figure 2b.
4.2. Notations
For ease of description, some intuitive notations and abbre-
viations used in our proposed protocol are shown in Table 2.
4.3. Technical Details
4.3.1. System Setup
Step S1. The administrator holds a database with |~Lv| records
of legitimate voter and publishes the following parameters
to the bulletin board to set up the system:
1) The parameters of the re-encryption scheme and
multi-designated verifiers signature scheme, i.e. par.
2) Self-signed public key certificate of administrator
used in this round of voting. We denote such pub-
lic key as yA.
3) A vector ~Lk of re-encryption keys from administrator
to each voter.
4) A kind of collision-free one-way hash function de-
noted as Hash(·).
Step S2. Every candidate in the candidate slate ~Lc publishes its
public key yC j to the bulletin board.
4.3.2. Credential Dispatching
For i = 1, . . . , |~Lv|, administrator executes:
Step C1. Administrator generates a new pair of short-term
public/secret keys (PKi, S Ki).
Step C2. Administrator generates a multi-designated verifiers
signature si ← S ignxA,~Lv (PKi) using the described al-
gorithm. This signature, together with the signed mes-
sage PKi, is the so-called credential, which is denoted as
σi = (PKi, si).
Step C3. Administrator encrypts the short-term secret keys
S Ki and credential σi using the first-level Enc algorithm
of PRE scheme ci ← EncyA (S Ki, σi).
Step C4. Administrator sends the first-level encryption cipher-
text ci to the proxy.
After receiving every ciphertext ci from administrator, the
proxy executes the following steps:
Step C5. Proxy randomly chooses an unused number j from
1 to |~Lv|, and finds the corresponding re-encryption key
rkA→V j from vector ~Lk.
Step C6. Proxy transfers ciphertext ci encrypted under admin-
istrator’s public key yA to ciphertext under public key
of the lth voter by using re-encryption algorithm c′i ←
ReEncrkA→Vl (ci).
Step C7. Proxy sends the re-encrypted ciphertext c′i to the j
th
voter.
After all credentials are dispatched, administrator packs a list
of voting credential and encrypts it with the public key of proxy
as EncyP (~Lσ) and sends to the proxy. Proxy then decrypts it
and maintain a hashtable (as shown in Figure 3) of all voting
credentials.
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Administrator
Proxy
Voters
4. Se
nd th
e cip
herte
xt.
6. Send the re-
encryption ciphertext.
1. Run KeyGen to get a new
public/secret key pair.
2. Sign the new generated
public key.
3. Encrypt the public/secret
key pair and the signature.
5. Choose a random voter, and
transform the ciphertext to
another one under its public key.
(a) Credential Dispatching Stage.
Voters
Proxy
Bulletin Board
1. Decrypt the received ciphertext,
and get the public/secret key pair and
a signature.
2. Check the validity of the signature.
3. Choose a favourite candidate, and
generate the ballot.
4. S
end
 the
 bal
lot.
5. Generate a message, and encrypt it.
7. Publish the
transformed ciphertext.
6. Transform the encrypted
ciphertext with the incoming ballot.
(b) Ballot Casting Stage.
Fig. 2. High level description: How our voting protocol benefits from proxy re-encryption.
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Fig. 3. The list that proxy maintains.
4.3.3. Ballot Casting
After receiving c′i , the l
th voter executes the following steps:
Step B1. Voter decrypts c′i with its secret key xVl and gets
plaintext (S Ki, σi)← DecxVl (c′i).
Step B2. Voter checks the validity of the credential σi by using
multi-designated verifiers signature verification algorithm
Veri f yyA (PKi, si). If the algorithm outputs 0, voter will
abort voting process and may denounce the misbehavior
of authorities.
Step B3. Voter chooses a desired candidate Cx, and generates
a ballot by using re-encryption key generation algorithm
Ballot ← ReKeyGen(S Ki, yCx ).
Step B4. Voter uses the given hash function to compute the
hash value of the voting credential hi ← Hash(σi).
Step B5. Voter sends message ml = (Ballot, hi) to the bulletin
board via an anonymous communication channel.
For every message ml which voter cast to the bulletin board,
the proxy executes the following steps:
Step B6. Proxy queries the maintained list of credentials. If
hash value of the incoming credential is illegal or used,
proxy will abort the process.
Step B7. Otherwise, proxy uses current timestamp as plaintext
m′l ← S tp, and encrypts the chosen plaintext under public
key PKi using the first-level Enc algorithm of PRE scheme
δl ← EncPKi (m′l).
Step B8. Proxy transfers ciphertext encrypted under public key
PKi to ciphertext under public key of candidate yCx by us-
ing re-encryption algorithm δ′l ← ReEncBallot(δl). δ′l is the
so called voting transaction.
Step B9. Proxy publishes the voting transaction δ′l to bulletin
board.
4.3.4. Ballot Opening and Tallying
A candidate, say C j, keeps continuous attention on voting
transactions from bulletin board. When a new transaction, say
δx, is published, candidate C j attempts to decrypt it using its
own secret key xC j . Once decryption succeeds, and the out-
come is a timestamp, a ballot towards candidate C j is called
to be opened. Candidate C j can keep secret that how many
ballots it has received until date of tallying. At that date, ad-
ministrator sends a message to bulletin board that separate the
messages from different phases and inform candidates to pub-
lish their private key to bulletin board with their encoded iden-
tity like {xC j ,C j}. After that, candidates publish as many valid
messages as possible to bulletin board.
A tallying script on bulletin board will also be triggered to
count the number of ballots of each candidate. After all bal-
lots are tallied, messages that show ”who received how many
ballots” will also be published to bulletin board.
4.3.5. Ballot Verifying and Auditing
An additional auditing can optionally be implemented by
election holder and any skeptical voter. This is easy to achieve
because the set of private keys of candidates has been published
on the bulletin board and all re-encrypted ballots can also be
found.
8
5. System Evaluation
5.1. Analysis of Security Properties
In this subsection, we give a heuristic analysis, as vast ma-
jority of previous voting protocols, on the security properties of
our proposed scheme.
Ballot secrecy. Since the ballot in our proposed protocol is
the re-encryption key in proxy re-encryption scheme, the se-
crecy of the ballot derives from the secrecy of re-encryption
key. The secrecy of re-encryption key requires that adversaries
(proxy) can not identify either delegator (voter) or delegatee
(candidate) when given the re-encryption key rkV→C . This is
achieved by the key-privacy property in proxy re-encryption
schemes. Additionally, since the anonymous credential that
voter receive is different in each round of voting, ballot will
not be the same even when the voter vote for the same candi-
date. Hence no external observation can obtain the relationship
between a particular voter and vote.
Unreusability and Eligibility. Only if an unused valid cre-
dential is showed, the ballot would be accepted by proxy. If a
credential is repeated, proxy will reject corresponding ballots.
This design makes our proposal satisfy unreusability. Since
credentials are only dispatched to legal voters, and since the se-
cure one-way hash function is collision-free, illegal voters can
not off the hash value of a valid credentials which they are un-
known. Accordingly, the illegal ones will easily be detected
when casting their ballots. Hence eligibility is achieved.
Voter-fairness and Candidate-adaptiveness. Since the vot-
ing transactions are re-encrypted randomness under public key
of candidate, no voter can learn about the voting outcome be-
fore the tallying phase. Hence voter-fairness is achieved. Each
candidate can learn how many votes are towards itself in the
voting process. Candidate is able to have a direct understand-
ing about what percentage his votes account for. However, he
cannot explicitly know how many votes other candidates get.
That means candidate-adaptiveness.
5.2. Analysis of Receipt-freeness and Coercion-resistance
Receipt-freeness Analysis: 6 In analysis receipt-freeness
analysis, we first consider whether voter can construct a prov-
able receipt by using materials which can be easily obtained
by adversaries. Since all communication is carried via pub-
lic channel, adversaries can readily obtain ballot rki→C j from
anonymous source, hash value of credential Hash(σi), cipher-
text under candidate’s public key EncyC (#)
7 and encryption
form of credentials EncyV (σi). During the voting procedure,
adversaries may try the following strategies:
Strategy 1: AdversaryA may try to find out how Alice vote
from what she cast to bulletin board, i.e. rki→C j and Hash(σi).
Only if A can retrieve σi, this attack will succeed. That is
because, in many scenariosA is played by candidate, say B˜ob,
himself. Just as what proxy does, A can choose a particular
6In the context of receipt-freeness, Alice cannot reveal her voting key, i.e.
credential in our protocol.
7# is just a placeholder.
string, encrypt it with the short-term public key in credential
σi and then transform it with the ballot rki→C j . Since A holds
the private key of B˜ob, he can easily verify whether the ballot
is voting for B˜ob. However, what A can obtain is Hash(σi).
Since the one-wayness property of Hash function, this strategy
is not feasible in protocol.
Strategy 2: AdversaryA may try to find out how Alice vote
from her ballot and the processed voting transaction, i.e. rki→C j
and EncyC (#).
A˜lice, the tamed voter, involves in this attack. A bribes A˜lice
for her support and requires her proof. However, as described in
Section 4 and Appendix A, the final ciphertext published on the
bulletin board is in form of EncyC (#) = δ
′
j = ReEncBallot(#) =
(t′1, t
′
2) = (Z
a j2y, # · Zy), where y = k(ai1 + r) + ww′ (Equa-
tion (A.1)). Since the random factors k, #,w′ ∈R Zq is brought
in by proxy, A˜lice has no knowledge about that which message
on bulletin board is correlated to her own choice. Thus, A˜lice
cannot convinceA that she voted as he wishes.
Coercion-resistance Analysis: Laocoo¨n also achieves a
stronger notion of receipt-freeness which is entitled with
coercion-resistance in Juels et al.’s protocol (Juels et al., 2005).
In the model of coercion-resistance, the capability of adversary
A has been extremely amplified. A can coerce Alice to divulge
her voting credential and coerce proxy to leak what randomness
it brought in during the process. To sum up, Jeuls et al. ad-
vance three types of attack that coercion-resist protocol should
defend:
Randomization Attack: Adversary A can coerce Alice by
requiring that she submit randomly composed balloting mate-
rial. This attack aims to nullify voting result with a large prob-
ability and works in precincts where competitors gains more
popularity.
Forced-abstention Attack: Adversary A can coerce Alice
by demanding that she refrain from voting. This attack works
when authentication is in a direct and public approach.
Simulation attack: Adversary A can coerce Alice by caus-
ing her to divulge her private keying material after the registra-
tion process but prior to the election process. Then A can cast
the ballot in name of Alice.
Our defence: Laocoo¨n defend the above attacks by allow-
ing voters to generate fake credentials which is indistinguish-
able to possible adversaries. Since the integrity of credentials
is promised by designated verifiers signature, adversary who
is outside the set of verifiers cannot distinguish whether the
coerced credential is fake or not. If coercion happens multi-
ple times, voter can simply release the same fake credential σ˜.
Thus, our proposed protocol is secure against coercion attacks.
5.3. Analysis of Efficiency and Comparison
In this subsection, we analysis the efficiency of our proposed
voting protocol in terms of computation cost and communica-
tion cost. The result can be seen in Table 3. In the analysis, we
only take time spent on pairings and exponentiations into con-
sideration, since the complexity of hash function, multiplica-
tions or additions in finite cyclic groups is relatively negligible.
We denote by E1 a exponentiation inG, by E2 a exponentiation
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Table 3
Analysis of Efficiency
Phases Entities Computation Cost Time Spent Communication Cost
Credential Dispatching
Administrator 3E1 + 2E2 + S + Sig 20.4ms + timeS 2|G1| + |GT |
Proxy 2E2 + 3S + 4P 24.9ms 2|GT |
Ballot Casting
Voter E1 + 4E2 + P + Vfy 14.7ms + timeV 3|G1| + 3|GT | + |Hash|
Proxy 2E1 + 3E2 + 4S + 4P 38.3ms 2|GT |
Ballot Opening Candidate E2 0.6ms |Zq|
* Measurement: per vote.
in GT , by P a pairing operation. Sig and Vfy respectively de-
note the signature and verification in digital signature scheme.
For ease of comprehension, we also give the concrete time spent
in Table 3, whose data are from references (Shao et al., 2012;
Shi et al., 2007; Kiltz, 2007). Accordingly, time spent on one
exponentiation in G, one exponentiation in GT and one pair-
ing are respectively 6.4, 0.6 and 5.9 ms. These benchmarks
are measured on a workstation whose processor is a 64-bit, 3.2
GHz Pentium 4. Note that groupsG,GT all have a order of 160-
bit where the former two groups are used in proxy re-encryption
scheme. One element inG,GT is 512-bit length. Since the con-
struction of MDVS scheme is not related to the security of our
protocol, we will not delve deep into its algorithm details and
denote the time cost of signature and verification respectively
as timeS and timeV .
We also consider the communication cost of our proposed
protocol. As shown in Table 3, our protocol enjoys a rather
small communication cost. Since only messages which are pub-
lished by proxy in Ballot Casting phase and by candidate in
Ballot Opening phase will be recorded on the bulletin board,
the size of the whole bulletin board is linear in the amount of
voters |~Lv|. That is, the complexity of tallying, O(|~Lv|), is linear
to voter account. After the overall consideration of computation
and communication cost, our proposed e-voting protocol is suit-
able for large scale elections (a.k.a. referendums). And since
the low overhead of voter side computation, and the no restric-
tion on the designated location in which voter casts its ballot,
our protocol also achieves mobility. That means our protocol
can be implemented into a vote-by-mobile system.
We also compare the properties in our proposed protocol with
some representative protocols reviewed in Section 1.1. We give
out our comparison in Table 4.
5.4. Towards Additional Properties
Individual Verifiability. Individual verifiability refers to the
capability of individual voters to confirm their choice has been
correctly encoded in voting script and counted in tallying result
(Ryan et al., 2009). Note that, verifiability is somewhat con-
tradicting to receipt-freeness (Wang et al., 2017). We proposed
a non-verifiability version above in Section 4. Here we find
a middle ground between verifiability and receipt-freeness and
show how individual verifiability can be extended to achieve in
our proposed protocol.
This extension takes advantage of bit commitment scheme
(Naor, 1991) used in Fujioka et al.’s voting protocol (Fujioka
et al., 1992). In Ballot Casting phase, proxy makes a bit com-
mitment about the voting credential using a randomly chosen
key k. The process is denoted as βi ← ξk(σi). In a round
of election, the key used for bit commitment is the same to
all different ballot. Enclosed with the voting transaction, the
commitment remains secrecy until Ballot Verifying and Au-
diting phase. Proxy publishes the key k to bulletin board in this
phase and all voter can confirm whether its ballot is correctly
encoded and counted in the voting process. Additionally, for
a more user-friendly approach, one may consult (Ryan et al.,
2016; Iovino et al., 2017)
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduced key-private proxy re-encryption
as a new cryptographic tool to construct e-voting protocols.
Based on this special PRE scheme, we proposed Laocoo¨n, a
practical and receipt-free protocol for large scale remote elec-
tronic voting. Additionally, in our protocol, candidates knows
their approval rating throughout the voting process. Due to
receipt-freeness, candidates are allowed to rise legal voting
campaigns except for any bribing or coercion. Experimental re-
sults show that our protocol enjoys a light-weighted voter-side
calculation and is efficient enough to deploy in a referendum.
Finally, we acknowledge that there are still many possible
and attractive problems that need further investigation.
1. Laocoo¨n has one deficiency, where the voting authorities
are centralized. It will be fragile to defend a (distribute)
denial-of-service (DoS/DDoS) attack and not robust when
adversary corrupts all voting authorities. Many voting pro-
tocols address these attacks in a threshold manner. It re-
mains an interesting problem that whether Laocoo¨n can be
extended to a multi-authorities version. As a simple envi-
sion, multi-use or threshold PRE schemes can be utilized.
2. Few study in proxy re-encryption has considered the po-
tential of PRE to construct a voting system. The PRE
scheme used in our work is just CPA secure and based
on bilinear pairings. Our voting protocol can be more effi-
cient and secure as the result of using better PRE schemes.
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Table 4
Property Comparison of Different Receipt-freeness Voting Protocols
Functionalities
Protocols
Okamoto
(1997)
Lee & Kim
(2002)
Juels et al.
(2005)
Chow et al.
(2008)
Xia et al.
(2018)
Our protocol
Receipt-freeness X X X X X X
Unreusability X X X X X X
Ballot Secrecy X X X X X X
Vote-and-go × × X X X X
Coercion-resistance × × X × × X
Efficiency X X X X × X
Scalability X X X × × X
Mobility × × X X × X
Light-weight a × × × X X X
Verifiability × X × X X © b
Fairness X X X X X ×
Voter-fairness × × × × × X
Candidate-adaptiveness × × × × × X
Without Untappable Channel × Xc X × × X
a It refers to as light-weight voter-side calculation.
b Note that© denotes extensible.
c Their protocol takes advantage of trusted hardware.
Hence, identifying which particular kind of PRE is suit-
able for voting and proposing more efficient and secure
PRE schemes of that kind can be regarded as another open
problem.
3. Some of the existing e-voting protocols (Unruh & Mu¨ller-
Quade, 2010; Alwen et al., 2015) provided a more rigor-
ous proof of the security guarantees. These protocols are
adapted in the universal composability (UC) framework
(Canetti, 2001). Evaluating security of our e-voting proto-
col in the UC framework is also considered as our future
work.
Appendix A. Algorithm Details of a Key-private Proxy Re-
encryption Scheme (Ateniese et al., 2009)
An efficient single-use unidirectional key-private PRE
scheme SU-KP-PRE = (Setup, KeyGen, ReKeyGen, Enc,
ReEnc, Dec) consists of six algorithms. The detailed descrip-
tion is as follows.
Setup: par ← Setup(1k). On inputting the security parame-
ter k, the outputting system parameters are (g, h, q,G,GT , eˆ,Z),
where G is a finite cyclic group generated by g. And h is an-
other random generator of G. G and GT are of prime order q.
And eˆ is a efficient bilinear map such that eˆ: G×G→ GT . Z is
computed by Z = eˆ(g, h).
KeyGen: (PKi, S Ki)← KeyGen(par). The public key is set
as PKi = (pki1, pki2) = (Zai1 , gai2 ) for random ai1, ai2 ∈R Zq.
Here (ai1, ai2) is the corresponding secret key.
ReKeyGen: rki→ j ← ReKeyGen(S Ki, PK j). On inputting
a public key PK j = (pk j1, pk j1) = (Za j1 , ga j2 ) and a secret key
S Ki = (ai1, ai2), the re-encryption key rki→ j is constructed as
follows.
1. Randomly choose r,w ∈R Zq.
2. Compute
rki→ j = ((ga j2 )ai1+r, hr, eˆ(ga j2 , h)w, eˆ(g, h)w)
= ((ga j2 )ai1+r, hr,Za j2w,Zw)
(A.1)
Enc: ci ← EncPKi (m). On inputting a public key PKi =
(pki1, pki2) = (Zai1 , gai2 ) and a message m ∈ GT , the following
steps are calculated by encryptor:
1. Randomly choose k ∈R Zq.
2. Compute the ciphertext ci = (gk, hk,m · Zai1k).
ReEnc: c j ← ReEncrki→ j (ci). On inputting a re-encryption
key rki→ j = (R1,R2,R3,R4) = ((ga j2 )ai1+r, hr,Za j2w,Zw) and a
ciphertext ci = (α, β, γ) = (gk, hk,m · Zai1k) under public key
PKi, proxy transforms the second-level ciphertext into a first-
level one as follows.
1. Check whether eˆ(α, h) = eˆ(g, β). If the equation does not
hold, the algorithm outputs ⊥ and aborts; otherwise there
exists some k ∈ Zq and m ∈ GT such that α = gk, β =
hk and γ = m · Zai1k, and thus, ci = (α, β, γ) is a valid
encryption of message m under PKi = (Zai1 , gai2 )
2. Compute t1 = eˆ(R1, β) = eˆ(ga j2(ai1+r), hk) = Za j2k(ai1+r).
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3. Compute t2 = γ · eˆ(α,R2) = m · Zai1k · eˆ(gk, hr) = m · Zai1k ·
Zrk = m · Zk(ai1+r).
4. Randomly choose w′ ∈R Zq.
5. Re-randomize t1 by setting t′1 = t1 · Rw
′
3 = Z
a j2k(ai1+r) ·
(Zwa j2 )w
′
= Za j2(k(ai1+r)+ww
′).
6. Re-randomize t2 by setting t′2 = t2 · Rw
′
4 = m · Zk(ai1+r) ·
(Zw)w
′
= m · Zk(ai1+r)+ww′ .
7. Output the re-encrypted ciphertext c j = (t′1, t
′
2) = (Z
a j2y,m ·
Zy), where y = k(ai1 + r) + ww′.
Dec: m ← DecS Ki (ci). On inputting secret key S Ki =
(ai1, ai2) and any ciphertext ci under public key PKi:
- If ci is an original ciphertext (a.k.a. second-level cipher-
text), such as ci = (α, β, γ) = (gk, hk,m · Zai1k), the decryp-
tion algorithm execute the following steps:
1. Check whether eˆ(α, h) = eˆ(g, β). If the equation does
not hold, the algorithm outputs ⊥ and aborts; other-
wise goes to next steps.
2. Output m = γ/eˆ(α, h)ai1 .
3. Note that m may be ⊥.
- If ci is an re-encrypted ciphertext (a.k.a. first-level ci-
phertext), such as ci = (α, β) = (Zai2y,m · Zy), output
m = β/α1/ai2 as the result.
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